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Agricultural cooperatives are often viewed as appropriate vehicles to facilitate 
vertical coordination with, or horizontal integration between, small farmers who 
would otherwise be excluded from value-adding opportunities and discerning 
markets. In South Africa, renewed interest in development-oriented cooperatives 
saw the introduction of a new Cooperatives Act in 2005, along with support 
measures dedicated to ‘emerging’ cooperatives. This paper contends that the 
architects of the new Act discounted important trends in international legislation 
that would have made development-oriented cooperatives more versatile and given 
their members better access to capital and expertise through equity partnerships 
with private agribusiness firms. It is concluded that the new Act should be 
amended to admit non-patron investors as members, and to allow for non-
redeemable and hence appreciable and tradable shares. Such innovations are 
emerging internationally, usually with a cap on non-patron voting power. 
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Agricultural value-adding cooperatives are often rationalised as a way of 
reducing transaction costs and alleviating hold-up problems caused by asset 
specificity through vertical coordination of farmers into processing and 
marketing activities (Cook & Iliopoulus, 1999; Plunkett & Kingwell, 2001). 
Cooperatives also represent horizontal integration, an extreme form of 
horizontal coordination in which farmers surrender use rights and decision-
making power to a manager in exchange for a different set of property rights, 
namely benefit and voting rights. In the development context, cooperatives are 
often driven by hopes that horizontal integration will reduce fixed ex ante 
transaction costs that keep small farmers out of product markets, and which 
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are increasing with mounting concerns about food safety and the environment 
(Poulton & Lyne, 2008). Indeed, horizontal integration was an important part 
of the thinking behind South Africa’s new Cooperatives Act, 14 of 2005. 
Speaking during his visit to land reform projects in the country’s North West 
province, Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Dirk du Toit, 
commented, “It is difficult for individual emerging farmers to survive in this 
industry. This is why it is important for them to form cooperatives to not only 
penetrate the market but also be competitive” (BuaNews, 2006). 
 
One of the purposes of the new Act is to ensure the provision of support 
programmes for ‘emerging’ cooperatives, a term used to describe 
development-oriented cooperatives established to promote the interests of 
previously disadvantaged people. In June 2005, the Minister of Trade and 
Industry, Mandisi Mpalwha, announced that incentives and capacity building 
grants had been designed for development-oriented cooperatives, and that 
government financing agencies (including Khula and SEDA) had been 
mandated to support cooperatives (GCIS, 2005). The availability of dedicated 
support suggests that cooperatives will also play an important role in the 
management of community-owned resources acquired through land reform, 
including reforms planned for the country’s communal areas. The 
Cooperatives Act explicitly targets black people in rural areas. This study 
questions the decision to dedicate public support to cooperatives when the 
interests of their members might better be served by other forms of 
organisation. 
 
The paper draws on the New Institutional Economics to analyse the type of 
cooperative organisation predicated by South Africa’s new Cooperatives Act, 
and to assess its worth as a vehicle for development. It is contended that the 
architects of the Act discounted important trends in international legislation 
that would have made South African cooperatives more versatile and given 
development-oriented cooperatives better access to capital and expertise 
through partnerships with firms in the formal economy. If this hypothesis is 
true, recommendations can be made to amend sections of the Act in ways that 
strengthen the empowerment prospects of development-oriented cooperatives 
and so improve the productivity of public support dedicated to them. The 
paper sketches the ‘cooperative revival’ in South Africa and then introduces a 
hypothetical case to illustrate the institutional flaws that constrain traditional 
cooperatives. Section 3 describes variations of the traditional cooperative, each 
involving institutional changes to promote growth. Section 4 explores 
dramatic changes recently adopted by developed countries seeking to their 
make their value-adding cooperatives more competitive. The final section 
considers amendments to South Africa’s new Cooperatives Act and its related 
support programmes. 
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2.  Renewed support for cooperatives in South Africa  
 
Mpalwha (2005:1) contends that African intellectuals and leaders favour 
cooperatives (to empower marginalised communities) because “African 
society is ideally suited to working in cooperatives”. South Africa’s 2003 
Presidential Growth and Development Summit endorsed special measures to 
support development-oriented cooperatives. Following this commitment, 
government responsibility for cooperatives was transferred from the 
Department of Agriculture (DoA) to the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) (Philip, 2003). The DTI drafted new policy on cooperatives and a Draft 
Bill that was gazetted in 2003. The Bill was enacted in August 2005.  
 
However, the First Draft Cooperatives Bill was prepared in 2001 by the DoA. 
This original draft borrowed heavily from Canadian legislation (COSATU, 
2001) that introduced innovative changes to help value-adding cooperatives 
source additional capital (see section 4.5). In particular, section 104 of the First 
Draft Cooperatives Bill provided for ‘investor shares’ that could be purchased 
by non-members and which conferred limited voting rights on their holders. 
This provision was severely criticised by the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) as it imposed ‘a model of cooperatives that is antithetical to 
the principles of cooperatives and seems to be crudely imposing a “business 
conception” of a cooperative’ (COSATU, 2001, section 5.2.5). The offending 
sections were cut from the DTI’s Draft Bill that was enacted in 2005.  
 
The new Act introduces public support for development-oriented 
cooperatives. The DTI will treat these initiatives as small and medium 
enterprises (SMMEs) and, as such, they will qualify for all of the incentive and 
support programmes offered by the Department and its agencies to SMMEs in 
the broad areas of training and access to finance. Beyond this, the DTI will also 
offer dedicated financial and capacity building support to cooperatives. The 
additional financial support will most likely include incentives to assist start-
ups (Mpalwha, 2005). 
 
Ortmann and King (2006:62) recommend that small-scale farmers in South 
Africa should exploit the wave of support for cooperatives even though future 
growth of their enterprise may be constrained by institutional deficiencies 
inherent in traditional cooperatives. However, this approach is expected to 
waste scarce public resources as few development-oriented cooperatives are 
likely to survive the initial stages of enterprise development when weak 
institutions are imposed on communities bereft of capital and lacking in 
business skills. The historical record of such cooperatives has been dismal in 
South Africa. Van der Walt (2005) reports that 65 per cent of 54 registered 
cooperatives sampled in the Limpopo province were not functional. 
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Widespread failure of agricultural cooperatives in South Africa’s communal 
areas has been blamed largely on poor management (Van Niekerk, 1988; Van 
der Walt, 2005). Unfortunately, this naïve conclusion seems to have distorted 
plans for supporting cooperatives in favour of training. Training is important, 
but it will have little impact if underlying institutional problems discourage 
managers and members from growing the cooperative business. In their US 
study, Porter and Scully (1987) estimated that reorganising a randomly 
selected (traditional) fluid-milk processing cooperative as an investor-owned 
firm (IOF) could increase its output by 32.4 per cent - without hiring additional 
inputs. They concluded that tax breaks, interest subsidies and the gratis 
services of the US Department of Agriculture were keeping inefficient 
cooperatives in business. 
 
Dedicated support for development-oriented cooperatives is a political reality 
in South Africa. This support will not be productive if emerging cooperatives 
are undermined by weak institutions. It is therefore important to establish the 
origins of institutional problems in traditional cooperatives and the extent to 
which prevailing legislation can accommodate changes to address these 
problems. Cook (1995:1159) argues that farmers who reorganise their 
cooperatives in ways that alleviate the problems created by flawed 
institutional arrangements have a bright future. His optimism, evidenced by 
the rapid growth of New Generation Cooperatives (NGCs) in the USA (Harris 
et al., 1996), is grounded in the argument that cooperatives hold a transaction 
cost advantage over firms owned by external investors because incentives are 
better aligned when farmers contract with their own organisation (Sykuta & 
Cook, 2001). 
 
3.  What institutional flaws constrain the growth of a traditional 
cooperative? 
 
To answer this question, it is useful to consider investments in growth assets 
that a cooperative needs in order to provide competitive services. These assets, 
be they tangible (like fixed improvements) or intangible (like product 
branding), must be financed from equity and/or debt capital. The problems 
that cooperatives have raising equity capital due to their flawed institutional 
arrangements (ill-defined property rights in particular) have been well 
documented (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Porter & Scully, 1987; Cook & 
Iliopoulos, 1999, 2000; Sykuta & Cook, 2001). Low lev e l s  o f  e q u i t y  c a p i t a l  
obviously compromise a cooperative’s credit-worthiness and hence the 
amount of capital that it can borrow. In addition, for any given level of equity, 
a cooperative’s ill-defined property rights further reduce its access to debt 
capital (Hendrikse & Veerman, 2001).  
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By way of example, consider a cooperative established to manage a common 
p o o l  g r a z i n g  r e s o u r c e  f o l l o w i n g  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o m m u n a l  L a n d  
Rights Act (CLaRA), Act 11 of 2004. CLaRA’s objectives include a reduction in 
open access land and the development of agricultural and tourism enterprises 
(Rugege, 2006). Assume that members of the community pay a small fee to 
join the emerging cooperative and that this fee finances one share in the 
cooperative. Livestock owned by shareholders can be added to an aggregate 
herd managed by the cooperative. Mature animals can be reclaimed by their 
owner or are sold by the cooperative with the cash proceeds accruing to the 
o w n e r .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s ,  t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e  i m p o s e s  a  l e v y  t o  c o v e r  o p e r a t i n g  
expenses. To improve herd productivity and net benefits accruing to member 
patrons, the cooperative must fence off and supply water to rotational grazing 
camps. Although some members could invest more equity capital to help 
finance these improvements, they are reluctant to do so owing to ill-defined 
benefit rights. 
 
First, a traditional cooperative limits dividends paid on equity capital, 
distributing most of its profits to members according to their level of 
patronage. These institutional arrangements stem from the fundamental 
principles of Voluntary and Open Membership and Member Economic 
Participation (ICA, 2005) which are widely interpreted as requiring (a) all 
members to be patrons and (b) distributing profits to patrons rather than to 
investors. These constraints are specified in sections 3(1)(a)3, 3(1)(d)4 and 44(1)5 
of South Africa’s new Cooperatives Act. Residual claims therefore reside with 
patrons, and this creates an internal free-rider problem. Relatively cash rich 
members of our grazing cooperative would have little incentive to finance 
fences and water points because the benefits will accrue largely to other 
patrons. 
 
Second, the principle of Voluntary and Open Membership also creates an 
external free-rider problem if our grazing cooperative does not have exclusive 
use rights to the communal grazing resource. Members would have even less 
incentive to finance fences and water points if the benefits were appropriated 
by non-members at, or below, the price paid by members. For the sake of 
convenience it will be assumed that our grazing cooperative can exclude non-
members, or charge them more for using its resources. 
 
                                                 
3 Membership … is open to [natural and juristic] persons who can use the services of the cooperative. Note that 
the word ‘can’ does not explicitly exclude members who are not patrons. 
4 The return paid on member capital is limited to the maximum percentage fixed in accordance with the 
constitution of that cooperative. 
5 A cooperative may allocate and credit or pay to its members a portion of the surplus that is not transferred as a 
reserve to a reserve fund … and such portion must be allocated in proportion to the value of transactions 
conducted by a member with a cooperative during a specified period. 
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Third, the founding members of our grazing cooperative would also be 
reluctant to finance fixed improvements because they cannot realise the full 
benefit of assets that generate returns beyond their period of membership. 
This ‘horizon’ problem arises because members of traditional cooperatives are 
not permitted to trade shares at their market value. Instead, the cooperative is 
entitled to redeem members’ shares at their original (par) value (see section 25 
of South Africa’s new Cooperatives Act). Again, these institutional 
arrangements emphasise the traditional view that profits should be distributed 
to patrons rather than to investors. The implication is that investors cannot 
realise capital gains when they leave the cooperative. Ultimately, these gains 
are captured by free-riders in the form of new members who benefit from 
improvements without paying market prices for their shares.  
 
Fourth, the members of our traditional grazing cooperative face ‘portfolio’ and 
‘control’ problems that are aggravated by an ‘influence’ problem. The latter 
problem arises due to ill-defined voting rights. The portfolio problem refers to 
sub-optimal investment by members because they are unable to transact 
shares and therefore cannot diversify their own portfolios to reflect personal 
risk preferences. Disincentives created by the portfolio problem become more 
pronounced when risk-averse members use their democratic voting majority 
to pressure management into making conservative investments. Outvoted, the 
more entrepreneurial members of our grazing cooperative would be hard 
pressed to influence management otherwise, denying the cooperative much-
needed capital and expertise. Democratic Member Control is a fundamental 
principle of traditional cooperatives (ICA, 2005). Section 14(1)(e)6 of South 
Africa’s Cooperatives Act entrenches this principle, the object of which is to 
ensure that cooperatives are controlled by users and not by investors (Barton, 
1989). Ironically, the control problem refers to the difficult task of monitoring 
the performance of management when there is no share market to signal 
changes in the value of the enterprise. To sum up, traditional cooperatives 
struggle to raise equity capital because ill-defined property rights leave 
investor-principals without residual claim, without residual control, and 
without information to evaluate their agent-managers. 
 
Fifth, returning to the issue of debt capital, the institutional problems that 
constrain levels of equity in traditional cooperatives also constrain levels of 
debt as lenders prefer their loans to be covered by equity in order to reduce 
their exposure to loan default. In addition, for any particular level of equity, a 
traditional cooperative’s ability to borrow is adversely affected by the 
influence problem, especially when the loan is needed to finance relation-
specific assets (Hendrikse & Veerman, 2001). Specific assets expose the 
                                                 
6 The constitution of a cooperative must include a provision stipulating that each member has one vote in all 
meetings of the cooperative, except in the case of secondary or tertiary cooperatives. 
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cooperative to hold-up problems (Royer, 1999) and so increase the lender’s 
risk of loan default. There is not much that lenders can do to reduce this risk 
when transacting with traditional cooperatives because it is difficult for them 
to influence managerial decisions when members have equal voting power. 
 
4.  How can traditional cooperatives be reorganised to promote 
enterprise growth? 
 
The arguments outlined in the previous section predict that our traditional 
grazing cooperative is unlikely to raise sufficient equity and debt capital to 
finance the fixed improvements needed to improve member benefits. What 
could be done to improve incentives to invest in this cooperative? A ‘solution’ 
adopted by some cooperatives is to insist that members purchase shares in 
proportion to their patronage. Cooperatives that adopt such arrangements are 
classified as proportional investment cooperatives (PICs) by Chaddad and 
Cook (2004).  
 
4.1 Proportional  investment cooperatives (PICs) 
 
PICs are complex to administer and oblige rather than encourage investment. 
In practice, PICs must assess each member’s patronage and continually 
redeem shares from members that become over-invested. In the USA, some 
PICs - like Dairy Farmers of America - allow equity to transfer between over- 
and under-invested members (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). Strictly speaking, it is 
not member shares that are transferred but ‘capital credits’ in a separate fund 
financed from contributions made by under-invested members to bring their 
total investment in line with their patronage.  
 
Our traditional grazing cooperative could reorganise as a PIC without any 
need for capital credits or any other form of quasi-equity. Proportionality 
between patronage and investment could be achieved simply by allowing 
members to exchange livestock for (redeemable) equity. In this case, the 
compulsory aspect of investment in a PIC is avoided if members can buy and 
sell livestock in a reasonably efficient market. This would address the internal 
free-rider problem but the other institutional problems that discourage 
member and lender investment would persist as shares in a PIC cannot be 
traded (portfolio problem) at their market value (horizon and control 
problems) and voting rights are egalitarian (influence problem). Following 
Chaddad and Cook’s (2004) hierarchical typology of cooperatives, our grazing 
cooperative might rather consider reorganising as a member-investor 
cooperative (MIC). 
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4.2  Member-investor cooperatives (MICs) 
 
The essential difference between a PIC and a MIC is that patronage and 
investment are decoupled and a substantial share of cooperative profits 
accrues to member-investors rather than to member-patrons. It is interesting 
that the case studies of MICs presented by Chaddad and Cook (2004) are 
drawn from the Netherlands, New Zealand and New South Wales (NSW) in 
Australia, suggesting that these countries have sanctioned significant 
deviations from the usual condition that a cooperative’s distributable profits 
must be allocated to users rather than to investors. NSW amended its 
Cooperatives Act in 1992, formalising quasi-equity shares as ‘cooperative 
capital units’ (CCUs). Section 269 of this Act defines a CCU as an interest 
issued by a cooperative conferring an interest in the capital, but not in the 
(members’) share capital, of the cooperative. MICs achieve close 
proportionality between member investment and returns by distributing 
profits as cash dividends in proportion to quasi-equity shares, and by 
permitting appreciation of these shares7. Again, this helps to alleviate the 
internal free-rider problem. 
 
CCUs are treated as personal property and, subject to the rules of the 
cooperative, are transferable. Some MICs in the Netherlands and New Zealand 
issue quasi-equity in the form of participation units and redeemable 
preference shares respectively (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). New Zealand’s 
Cooperative Companies Act, 24 of 1996, further allows the value of shares to 
appreciate so that capital gains can be realised when the shares are redeemed. 
Even so, these concessions do not fully address the portfolio, horizon and 
control problems because the shares can be redeemed at a price approved by 
the MIC’s (democratically elected) Board of Directors. The Board may approve 
conservative estimates of the share price in order to reduce the cooperative’s 
exposure to redemption risk and hence its need for unallocated reserves. This 
increases uncertainty about capital gains, reducing the tradability of quasi-
equity shares. The influence problem remains because quasi-equity shares 
held in a MIC do not confer voting rights in the cooperative. 
 
Could our grazing cooperative allocate a substantial share of its profits to 
member-investors rather than to member-patrons? Section 43(1) of South 
Africa’s new Cooperatives Act provides f o r  ‘ f u n d s  o f  m e m b e r s ’  i n  w h i c h  
individual members can be credited with contributions of their own capital, 
and section 43(2) provides for payment of ‘interest’ on these capital credits. 
Members could therefore purchase a sma l l  a m o u n t  o f  e q u i t y  b y  p a y i n g  a  
modest joining fee, and a relatively large amount of dividend-earning quasi-
                                                 
7 Patronage still captures part of net returns in the form of favourable prices. 
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equity by exchanging cattle or cash for capital credits in a fund of members. In 
theory, our grazing cooperative could reorganise as a MIC, but the MIC would 
m o s t  p r o b a b l y  r e d u c e  t o  a  P I C  a s  c a s h  i n v e s t m e n t s  w o u l d  b e  i n f e r i o r  t o  
livestock investments (which earn both dividend and patronage returns). In 
either case, the reorganisation would alleviate the internal free-rider problem. 
 
Could our grazing MIC further strengthen investment incentives by offering 
members transactable and appreciable capital credits? Section 43(2) of the 
South African Cooperatives Act, which defines the attributes of capital credits 
does not preclude transfers of capital credits between members and suggests 
that a cooperative could sanction such transfers in its constitution. However, 
transferability is unlikely to translate into tradability because capital credits 
are redeemable. The implication is that neither PICs nor MICs are likely to 
create strong incentives for member investment. Restructuring as a New 
Generation Cooperative (NGC), a popular format in the USA, may offer a 
more comprehensive solution. 
 
4.3  New generation cooperatives (NGCs) 
 
In essence, a NGC adds a new set of well-defined property rights to the ill-
defined property rights of a traditional cooperative. In a marketing 
cooperative, these new rights usually take the form of ‘delivery rights’ that 
members must purchase in order to access preferred markets secured by the 
cooperative. These rights are not redeemed by the cooperative and are 
tradable amongst members. New members have to purchase delivery rights 
from existing owners at their market price, enabling member-investors to 
realise capital gains.8 Capital gains are therefore aligned with investment, as 
are patronage returns when the delivery right is fully exercised. 
 
Conceptually, our grazing cooperative lends itself to the NGC format. 
Members could swap cattle or cash for non-redeemable, tradable ‘grazing 
rights’. Like delivery rights issued by marketing cooperatives, these grazing 
rights would determine the quantity of large livestock units that the member 
can supply each year depending on the pasture’s carrying capacity. The 
market value of these rights would reflect expectations about the performance 
of the NGC. 
 
Alignment of investment with capital gains and patronage returns addresses 
the internal free-rider problem. However, these parallel rights do not fully 
address horizon and control problems because members’ shares remain non-
tradable and therefore do not internalise or signal growth in NGC net worth. 
                                                 
8 Section 3(2)(a) of South Africa’s new Cooperatives Act provides for closed membership provided that 
restrictions on persons eligible for membership relate to the business of the cooperative. 
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In addition, these parallel rights have no effect on voting rights and therefore 
do not address the influence problem. Nonetheless, the NGC format could go 
a long way towards making our grazing cooperative a more attractive 
investment opportunity for member-patrons. Considering the support being 
offered to establish and sustain cooperatives in the developing regions of 
South Africa, NGCs might well be an appropriate vehicle to nurture horizontal 
integration for the purpose of conserving, improving and profitably exploiting 
common pool resources like natural grazing.  
 
4.4  When NGCs are not enough  
 
While this conclusion is consistent with views expressed by Ortmann and 
King (2006) who support the use of cooperatives to improve smallholder 
access to input and product markets, it would be naïve to extend this assertion 
to the management of toll goods (i.e. goods characterised by high excludability 
and low rivalry) acquired by groups of land reform beneficiaries, including 
those in communal areas. To illustrate, consider the case of a beneficiary 
community that has registered the title of its land to a communal property 
association (CPA) and which would like to develop the property’s 
considerable eco-tourism potential. To exploit this commercial opportunity, 
the CPA needs to construct and manage lodges and facilities to accommodate 
tourists. This requires significant capital and expertise – factors of production 
that the community is sorely lacking but which could be acquired by taking on 
an experienced business partner. CPAs were designed to hold property and 
not to conduct business. In reality, they suffer all of the problems associated 
with ill-defined property rights in traditional cooperative. Moreover, they do 
not issue shares and may not hold shares other than in a company listed on a 
licensed stock exchange.9 Could the CPA lease the eco-tourism site to a 
cooperative that is able to attract equity capital from community members and 
an experienced business partner? Neither PICs, MICs nor NGCs accommodate 
investment by non-members. In these cooperative arrangements, equity and 
quasi-equity investments are restricted to member-patrons (suppliers of 
labour in this eco-tourism example) whose incentive to invest is diluted - at 
the very least - by an influence problem.  
  
Government’s response might be to establish a traditional cooperative and 
then to help it forge strategic alliances with business partners. Chaddad and 
Cook (2004) summarise several examples of such ‘solutions’ adopted by 
marketing and processing cooperatives in the USA, Ireland and France. In the 
popular ‘Irish model’ assets are transferred out of the cooperative into a 
company that raises equity from private investors – a form of ‘virtual’ de-
                                                 
9 See section 9(e)(iv) of the Communal Property Association Act, 28 of 1996. 
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mutualisation. It is conceivable that our eco-tourism cooperative could use its 
lease to finance equity in an IOF shared with a business partner. However, this 
merely shifts the expected conflict between patrons and external investors to 
the IOF and does not shield members from problems created by ill-defined 
property rights in their cooperative. A unitised trust would better serve as a 
warehouse for members’ interests in an IOF as tradable units assigning benefit 
and voting rights that are proportional to individual investments in the trust 
can be matched directly to shares acquired by the trust in the IOF. 
 
Outright conversion of marketing and processing cooperatives into IOFs has 
perhaps been the most dramatic global cooperative trend in recent years. Such 
de-mutualisation has been most noticeable in countries where government 
support for agricultural cooperatives has been scaled down or removed 
altogether. Hendrikse and Veerman (1999) cite cases of leading marketing 
cooperatives in Ireland and The Netherlands converting to private or listed 
companies. This parallels the proliferation of NGCs in the US where 
cooperative status still affords tax breaks, interest subsidies and the gratis 
services of the US Department of Agriculture. In Canada, cooperatives in the 
grain, dairy and poultry industries have converted to IOF status despite 
legislative changes to facilitate the creation of NGCs (FGPD, 2006). In South 
Africa, deregulation of agricultural markets and reform of the financial sector 
in the 1990s removed many of the privileges that masked the inefficiencies of 
marketing cooperatives serving commercial farmers. These privileges included 
regional monopoly power and the distribution of cheap credit (Ortmann & 
King, 2006). Since 2000, some of the country’s largest agricultural cooperatives 
have converted to listed companies. Prominent amongst these are OTK, now 
trading as Afgri Limited (Business.com, 2006), and KWV, now trading as 
KWV Limited (KWV, 2003). Both of these groups raise equity capital on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange.  
 
Returning to our development-oriented eco-tourism cooperative and its 
options for attracting capital and expertise, the question may be framed in 
terms of its ability to reward investors without altering its legal status and 
foregoing the support dedicated to emerging cooperatives. Could it be 
reorganised as an investor-share cooperative (ISC) in which non-members 
would be able and willing to invest? 
 
4.5  Investor-share cooperatives (ISCs) 
 
Changes made to cooperative legislation in Australia, Europe, Canada, New 
Zealand and the USA since the early 1990s have challenged the view that 
Member Economic participation requires profits to be distributed according to 
patronage rather than investment. Sections 271 and 272 of the 1992 NSW 
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Cooperatives Act allow non-members to purchase CCUs, but deny them 
voting rights. Chaddad and Cook (2004) refer to ISCs in France where 
legislation passed in 1992 permitted outsiders to purchase quasi-equity shares 
in cooperative societies. However, even if these quasi-equity shares are 
technically transferable and appreciable, they may not be attractive to 
investors because uncertainty about capital gains is heightened when shares 
are non-voting and redeemable. 
 
In Canada, cooperatives in some jurisdictions provide for external investments 
through a distinct class of shares that are non-voting and non-redeemable 
(FGPD, 2006). Chaddad and Cook (2004) describe the case of the Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool, a marketing cooperative that introduced B shares in 1996 that 
were subsequently floated on the Toronto Stock Exchange. They also refer to 
Denver-based CoBank in the USA, which completed a private placement of 
non-voting, non-redeemable preferred stock in 2001. Section 2(1)(a) of New 
Zealand’s Cooperative Companies Act allows non-patron investors to exercise 
voting power in a cooperative but restricts their collective voting power to a 
maximum of 40 per cent. In 2003, the Livestock Improvement Corporation 
(LIC) became the first cooperative in New Zealand to list non-redeemable 
investor shares on the country’s alternative stock exchange, NZAX (ACCORD, 
2004). Since these shares are non-redeemable, their prices can be determined 
transparently in an active market. LIC actively sought to alleviate the control 
problem, as well as the free-rider, horizon and portfolio problems. In 2004, the 
Italian cooperative Granarolo also became a hybrid-listed cooperative (HLC) 
when it offered 20 per cent of its shares to external investors (Bekkum & 
Bijman, 2006). 
 
Beyond this, Hensley and Swanson (2003) describe dramatic changes to the 
Minnesota Cooperative Associations Act introduced in 2003 and codified in 
the Minnesota Statues as Chapter 308B. This new chapter was introduced 
because existing cooperative law (Chapter 308A) did not allow for outside 
equity investments in a cooperative. Chapter 308B was based on the Wyoming 
Processing Cooperative law which permitted cooperatives in that state to 
accept equity from non-patron members. Chapter 308B allows non-patron 
members to receive up to 85 per cent of a cooperative’s profits, and to control 
as much as 85 per cent of the voting power. Together, these requirements 
effectively cap the share of members’ equity held by non-patrons at 85 per 
cent. However, Chapter 308B also stipulates that patron-member directors 
must hold at least 50 per cent of the voting power ‘on general matters’ of the 
cooperative. Hensley and Swanson (2003) interpret this as meaning that 
‘special’ matters can be influenced by non-patron investors if they constitute a 
majority of the membership. This provides some relief from the influence 
problem. The requirement that at least 15 per cent of profits must accrue to 
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member-patrons was presumably intended to retain some of the transaction 
cost advantages attributed producer-owned firms in the event of patrons 
becoming a minority of the membership. Cooperatives established under 
Chapter 308B may elect to be taxed as cooperatives or as companies.  
 
In essence, the New Zealand, Wyoming and Minnesota models broadened the 
interpretation of ‘participation’ (in the principle of Member Economic 
Participation) to include investment, and sanctioned transferable, non-
redeemable and appreciable rights that make it possible for investors to realise 
capital gains and to influence strategic decisions. Those lobbying for these 
IOF-like institutions presume that it will be easier for cooperatives to raise 
equity capital and to establish joint ventures with strategic partners. Purists 
have questioned the dilution of cooperative principles, and legalists contend 
that these extreme ISCs may not qualify for all of the benefits and protection 
afforded to traditional cooperatives (Hensley & Swanson, 2003). It is not the 
purpose of this paper to make value judgments about what constitutes a 
cooperative, but rather to address an important question in the South African 
setting; does the country’s new Cooperatives Act allow development-oriented 
cooperatives to raise much needed capital and expertise by taking on external 
equity partners?  
 
Earlier it was argued that a cooperative could exploit the Act’s provisions for 
‘funds of members’ and reorganise as a MIC. Logically, a MIC could convert to 
ISC status by extending membership to non-patron investors. Although the 
Act defines members rather ambiguously as (natural or juristic) persons that 
can use the services of the cooperative, the removal of provisions for non-
member investor-shares in the first draft of the Cooperatives Bill following 
COSATU’s objection (COSATU, 2001) shows that the intention was to exclude 
non-patron investors. Even if the Registrar did permit external investors to 
become members of a cooperative on the grounds that it is not impossible for 
them to patronise the cooperative, neither patron nor non-patron members 
would have much incentive to invest in a fund of members because capital 
credits in such funds are redeemable and this impairs their tradability. Section 
14(2)(f) of the Act provides for associate members but defines them as non-
members and so prevents them from holding member shares or capital credits 
i n  a  f u n d  o f  m e m b e r s .  S o u t h  A f r i c a  did not follow the trend toward ISCs 
observed in developed countries and has dedicated public support to 
development-oriented cooperatives while effectively denying them access to 
the complementary capital and expertise of strategic equity partners.  
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5. Conclusions   
 
Policy makers in South Africa recognise the importance of horizontal 
integration to help poor people access markets and to profit from common 
pool resources. The government has upgraded cooperative legislation and is 
providing support to promote and establish development-oriented 
cooperatives. However, the new legislation perpetuates the notion of 
traditional cooperatives, ignoring trends in developed countries where 
cooperative legislation has been amended to encourage investment by patron 
and non-patron members. Admittedly, trends originating in developed 
nations may not be appropriate in developing countries, but the underlying 
problems that these changes sought to address will also constrain 
development-oriented cooperatives in South Africa. 
 
In developed countries, traditional marketing and processing cooperatives 
could not raise sufficient capital to finance the tangible and intangible assets 
needed to compete in global food markets because their institutional 
arrangements discouraged equity investors. In South Africa, development-
oriented cooperatives that require capital to finance fixed improvements like 
pack sheds, fences and tourist lodges will confront critical shortages of both 
capital and expertise. Given South Africa’s dual economy, an effective way of 
addressing these twin constraints is to establish equity-sharing joint ventures 
between communities and strategic partners in the private sector. 
Unfortunately, South Africa’s new Cooperatives Act prevents prospective 
partners from taking up equity in a development-oriented cooperative, and 
the idea of using a cooperative to warehouse members’ shares in an investor-
owned firm does not free its members from the problems created by ill-
defined property rights. A unitised trust would better serve this purpose. 
 
One way of promoting development-oriented joint ventures would be for 
government to amend the new Cooperatives Act in order to (a) admit non-
patron investors as members, and (b) allow for non-redeemable shares (capital 
credits) in funds of members. The first change would enable strategic partners 
to contribute equity capital to funds of members. The second would 
strengthen incentives for patron and non-patron members to invest in such 
funds by promoting the tradability of appreciable capital credits. Given these 
changes, a South African cooperative could legitimately introduce capital 
credits that potentially reward investors with both dividends and capital gains 
- provided that the properties of transferability, non-redeemability and 
appreciability of capital credits are specified in the cooperative’s constitution. 
Since all members have equal voting power, it is also conceivable that these 
changes might allow a multitude of non-patron investors to take control of a 
cooperative and reduce patronage returns in favour of dividends, so losing the 
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transaction cost advantage of well aligned incentives. In New Zealand, policy 
makers compromised by capping non-patron voting power at 40 per cent. In 
Minnesota non-patrons can command 85 per cent of voting rights, but 
directors elected by non-patrons cannot exercise a majority on all issues voted 
by the Board. In South Africa, policy makers did not seek a compromise. All 
provisions made for investor shares in the first draft of the Cooperatives Bill 
were removed when the Congress of South African Trade Unions objected to 
the dilution of cooperative principles. This decision needs to be reconsidered. 
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